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Abstract
Beginning with a snapshot of the recent raise in food prices, the present paper put in question
the hypothesis of it be a response to the near end of resources. Examining some medium and
long-run factors that explain the evolution of food production, with special focus on cereals,
using data of the World Bank for the last 45 years, and a regression for a cross-section of 106
countries, we show that: a) the capacity to feed a growing population has been associated to a
sustained increase in productivity, measured by the cereal yields; b) the increase in cereal
yields is negatively associated to the increase in land under cereal production; c) there is
large room to go on increasing cereal production and productivity in low and middle-income
countries, profiting from the productivity gap that differentiate them from the high-income
countries. So, the main conclusion is that the Limits to Grow’ perspective and the associated
Malthusian fears have no empirical support.
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The cost of food and other commodities has risen sharply, in recent time, generating a 
surge of debates and a range of policy responses, as can be seen in several Internet sites of 
well known international organizations
1. All these sites have not only useful data illustrating 
the main related problems, but also provide some answers to the following questions: a) Why 
are  food  prices  rising?  b)  What  role  has  increased  demand  for  bio-fuels  played  in  the 
increases?  c)  What  is  the  impact  of  high  world  food  prices  on  income  distribution-  who 
benefits  and  who  loses?  d)  How  are  the  policy-makers  responding  in  order  to cope  with 
negative  consequences  of  those  developments?  e)  What  kind  of  influence  do  “emerging 
economies” exert on the global food markets? f) Has climate change played a significant role 
in influencing those developments? g) Are the prices likely to continue rising in the future? 
(see, IFAD, 2008). The answers provided in articles and working papers, as well as in the 
mentioned  portals  themselves,  also  discuss  policy  measures  designed  to  minimize  the 
negative  effects  of  the  rising  food  prices.  A  common  conclusion  of  the  abovementioned 
papers and debates is the undermining effect of record food prices for the economy because of 
their potentially harsh effects on inflation and income distribution.  
However, while the impacts on inflation are uncontroversial, the negative distributional 
effects are debatable: some households benefit from higher prices, others are harmed by them, 
depending  on  whether  they  are  net  producers  or  consumers  of  such  now-more-expensive 
commodities, and on the extent to which wages adjust to higher food prices. It is generally 
accepted  that  poor  people,  especially  in  urban  areas,  suffer  due  to  rising  food  prices. 
Furthermore,  Ivanic  and  Martin  (2008) argue  that  the  huge  increases  in  food  prices  raise 
significantly the overall poverty in low-income countries. However in most, if not all, of such 
analyses the effects of prices are examined only on the demand side, the supply side is usually 
overlooked. Our analysis intends to call attention to the decisive role played by the long-run 
factors  that  shape  the  supply  of  foods,  with  particular  emphasis  in  cereal  production  and 
productivity. 
The range of policy responses that have been motivated by the high food prices goes from 
policies to reduce domestic food prices (reducing import tariffs and VAT, using buffer stocks 
to increase supply, generalized consumer subsidies, export bans /restrictions and producer 
price controls) to safety net programs (as is the case of cash transfers and food aid targeted to 
vulnerable people)
2. Some of such policy responses, as is the case of the restrictions imposed 
on agricultural exports (see Zaman et al., 2008), although understandable at domestic level in 
the short-run can, on the other hand, contribute to aggravate the problem both at national and 
international level in the near future. 
We aim to show that both the accuracy of the debates and the effectiveness of the policy 
measures depends on the answer to the following question: Is this increasing trend in food 
prices an expression of the imminent ending of resources, in line with the secular Malthusian 
fears, or this only corresponds to the impact of short-run factors that sooner or later will be 
counteracted? Because the price increase for cereal crops largely surpasses prices for other 
food commodities the present note focuses on the performance of cereals having in mind this 
important question. So, after the introduction we put in perspective the Limits to Growth’s 
approach and the most frequent explanations given for the recent increase in the food prices. 
In section 3 we examine the evolution of cereal productivity and the factors associated to it. 
Section 4 concludes. 
                                                 
1 For instance, www.worldbank.org/foodprices, www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation and www.ifpri.org. 
2 See Zaman et al. (2008) for a more complete picture of policy responses and for country examples.   2
2. The causes of the record food prices and the “Limits to Growth” 
2.1. The limits to growth: the implicit assumptions 
 
210 years  ago  Thomas Malthus wrote: The power of population is so superior to the 
power of the Earth to produce subsistence for man, that premature death must in some shape 
or other visit the human race (Malthus, 1978). 170 years after the words of Malthus born the 
think tank named the Club of Rome
3, and its discussions originate a well-known book where 
the Malthusian prophecy is updated with the basic significance that if the growth trends in 
world  population,  industrialization,  pollution,  food  production,  and  resource  depletion 
continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within 100 
years (Meadows et al., 1972). 
The way as the present food crisis is occurring rendered evident the fear of interaction 
between the increase in prices of energy with the move up in prices of food. This interaction 
can propel several negative effects, such as the beginning of an inflation spiral, with the well-
known  detrimental  impacts  on  economic  growth  and  income  distribution.  This  fear  was 
present in the recent G8 Hokkaido-Toyako Summit, as well as the recall of the first oil shock 
occurred in 1973 (see Zaman, et al., 2008). 
The price of energy can be related to the food prices in two ways. On the one hand, as 
energy  prices  increase,  costs  of  some  production  factors,  as  well  as  the  processing  and 
transportation of agricultural products, go up. This results in an increase in food price, with 
varying effects for different people. On the other hand, the raise in petroleum price may turn 
out to be increasingly efficient to produce energy from agricultural products. Consequently, 
competition for land and other resources will rise between productions for food versus for fuel 
(Henniges, 2005), raising once again the ghost of imminent ending of resources. 
In fact, the resource constraints prophesied by the Club of Rome were more evident two 
months ago than at any time since 1972, when the well-known book "The Limits to Growth" 
(Meadows et al., 1972) was published. But, such evidence can be determined by short-run 
factors that may be quickly reversed. As already was noted, “the next few months will be 
critical for stemming this joint crisis and avoiding any potential ripple effects” (Zaman, et al., 
2008, p. 1). But, there is always the danger of the end-of-resources’ ghost reappearance, if we 
don’t distinguish the short-term fluctuations from the medium-to-long-run trends. 
The basic argument of the Limits to Growth’s perspective can be summarized as follows. 
The  history  shows  that  after  the  Industrial  Revolution,  the  world  population  grew  at 
unprecedented  high  rates  and  this  population  increment  needs  an  equivalent  augment  in 
production. Furthermore, as the world grows more populous it also is growing more affluent, 
and so the average person is consuming more food, water, and power than before. The result 
is that if demand for resources climbed and supply doesn't keep pace, prices must increase 
further, and so economic growth in rich and poor nations alike could suffer.  
The decline in economic growth makes the poor part of population more vulnerable and, 
so, some violent conflicts can occur. Additionally, some of the resources now in great demand 
have no substitutes, or the substitutes known contend with the global warming
4. Furthermore, 
can  be  no  hypothesis  of  substitution  for  arable  land  and  fresh  water.  So,  the  conclusion 
follows: The world cannot sustain the last century level of growth. 
However,  both  the  original  prophesy  of  Malthus  (1798)  and  the  updated  version  of 
Meadows  et  al.  (1972)  are  based  on  the  assumption  of  a  natural  law  that  generates  two 
different dynamics. One model for demand, which grows in a geometric progression in the 
argumentation of the former, and evolves according to an exponential function in the latter. 
                                                 
3 See www.clubofrome.org. 
4 In the 18th century, England responded to diminishing timber supply by shifting to abundant coal, but today, 
coal is out of question. It emits greenhouse gases that most scientists say contribute to climate change.   3
Another very different for supply, which grows at an arithmetic progression in Malthus, and is 
conducted  by  technologies  for  expanding  resources  and  controlling  pollution,  allowed  to 
increase, if at all, only in discrete increments in the Limits to Growth’ perspective. So, in our 
view, what governs the evolution predicted by such analyses is not the evidence but such a 
priori assumptions. On the contrary, we consider that the evidence of the past 40 years shows 
that there is no reason to predict a significant different pace for increases in demand and in 
supply.  
 
2.2. The increase in food prices: short or long run factors? 
The comparison between table I and table II shows that the sharp increase of food prices is 
a recent phenomenon. It is subsequent to a long period of low food prices (see table II). Also, 
although the debate on the food prices had been stimulated by the recent price move up, it was 
ignited  by riots in several low and middle-income countries like Senegal, Mauritania and 
other African countries and mass protests in Mexico City, appealing to immediate solutions. It 
is worth noting that riots and protests have deeper roots that the increase of food prices only 
makes emerge, however for policymakers is easier, and more urgent, to combat symptoms 
rather than causes. 
 
Table I. Evolution of the FAO Food Price Index 
2007  2008 
June  July  Aug.  Sept.  Oct.  Nov.  Dec.  Jan.  Feb.  Mar.  April  May  June 
150  155  161  170  174  180  186  196  215  218  215  216  216 
Source: FAOSTAT (2008). 
 
As is apparent from table I, the FAO’s Food Price Index
5, which was 92 in 2000, averaged 
150, in June 2007, and 216 a year later. Among the several explanations for the causes of this 
increase there are the cumulative effects of the following: (1) the low levels of world stocks 
(especially for wheat and maize) following two years of below-average harvests in Europe in 
2006  and  2007; (2) the  crop breakdown in  major producing  countries partly due  to  poor 
weather conditions in North America, Europe and Australia, in 2006; (3) gradual changes in 
agricultural policies of the OECD countries, and particularly in EU, where reduced levels of 
subsidies have led to lower surplus production (4); and rapidly growing demand for cereal-
based bio-fuel production supported by subsidies
6.  
Though all these causes have acted cumulatively, some authors think that there is a chief 
factor: the large increase in the production of bio-fuels. This is, for instance, the case of 
Mitchell  (2008).  This  author,  after  examining  the  reasons  behind  the  quick  increase  in 
internationally traded food prices since 2002, concludes that the most important factor was the 
large increase in bio-fuels production in the U.S. and the EU. To put the table I index in 
perspective, it is useful to examine the evolution of the World Bank’s price index of food and 
prices of other commodities since the 1970s (table 2). 
Table 2 makes apparent some important facts: 
First, prices of food are highly correlated with the price of cereals (maize, rice and wheat) 
and, in a less extent, with the price of beef. But, because cereals are dependent of weather 
conditions, and have fixed periods for production, its world prices tend to be more volatile 
than world prices of industrial goods. This relationship between inelastic demand and volatile 
                                                 
5 The FAO food price index is a trade-weighted Laspeyres index of international quotations expressed in US 
dollar prices for 55 food commodities (see http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/FoodPricesIndex).  
6 Some add to these factors the action of the “Edge Funds”. They argue that, with the instability of shares in 
stock markets, the cereals are object of speculation with consequent increase in their prices.   4
supply creates more uncertainty for investors in cereal production and so policies aimed to 
reduce  uncertainty  are  usually  succeeded  in  increase  the  cereal  production  and  the 
corresponding stocks. It is partly in light of this fact that we must interpret the declining trend 
in the World Bank’s food price index.  
 
Table II. World Bank’s food price index and prices of other commodities 
  1970  1980  1990  1995  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  ρ 
Food price index (1990=100)  166  177  100  100  87  91  97  96  103  103  109  1 
Prices of:  
   Maize ($/mt)  208  159  109  105  91  95  107  105  104  92  110  0.91 
   Rice ($/mt)  450  521  271  274  208  183  206  197  222  267  276  0.97 
   Wheat ($/mt)  196  219  136  151  117  134  159  146  147  142  174  0.93 
   Beef (cents/Kg)  465  350  256  163  199  226  226  198  235  245  231  0.88 
Petroleum price index 
(1990=100)  19  204  100  64  127  113  117  126  154  218  254  -0.03 
Source: World Bank (2007). Note:  ρ is the correlation coefficient. 
 
Second, the government subsidies to farmers particularly in the beginning of the 1980s, 
helped stimulate cereal production in Western Europe and North America. The subsidies led 
to  a  surplus  of cereals, leading to  the emergence  of  Western Europe  as an important net 
exporter of cereals.  
Third, partly due to the increasing openness consequent to the movement of globalization, 
and partly due to the financial restrictions that governments face, in the late 1980s and the 
1990s  (Pessoa,  2008),  North  America  and  Western  Europe  reduced  in  some  measure  the 
financial  support  and  adjusted  the  form  of  subsidy  to  less  directly  influence  production 
decisions. In consequence, the growth in production of cereals slowed, beginning a resulting 
smoothly increasing price trend, from 2000 onwards.  
Fourth, whereas the food price index is positively correlated with prices of cereals and 
beef, it is not significantly correlated with the petroleum price index, indicating that in the 
medium-to-long-run the increase in price of food don’t have been associated to the price of 
petroleum.  
In face of the above facts, the inversion of the price trends around the ending of 20
th 
century is explained by the lagged effect of shifts in policy and not by the predicted ending of 
the existent resources. If this is so, the recent sharp increase in food prices documented in 
table I will tend to dissipate, giving place to the underling factors that govern the long-run 
evolution. Of course, this don’t mean that the instability of the food prices will be stopped but 
only that the long run trend will not be the extrapolation of the 2007-2008 increase. In this 
respect, we agree with Rosegrant et al (2001, p. 1) when they argued: “using short-term trends 
in global markets to make judgments about long-term food security is next to useless”.  
So, the future of food supply and demand, and the consequent level of prices, must be 
explained  by  not  only  the  evolution  of  long-term  forces  such  as  income  growth  and 
population  growth  but,  primarily  by  the  technological  change  in  agriculture,  driven  by 
investments  in  agricultural  research  complemented  by  well  suited  investments  in 
infrastructures for irrigation and transport and communications.  
 
3. The structural factors of the long run evolution 
The  classical  model  of  economic  growth,  and  the  Principle  of  Population  of  Malthus 
(1798), considers land as a fixed factor or as a factor that only can grow with a decreasing 
productivity. The Limits to Growth’s perspective also stress the shortage of land and, for the 
reasons  alleged  in  the  previous  section,  particularly  land  affected  to  cereal  production.   5
Furthermore, in the present conjuncture of high food prices and high prices of energy, the 
alleged competition between food and bio-fuels make the short supply of land more evident. 
So, we begin by analyzing the evolution of the amount of land under cereal production in the 
last 25 years (Table 3). 
 
Table III. Land under cereal production (thousand hectares)
7 
Countries/region  1979-81  1990-92  2003-05 
Low income  199,696  211,290  230,781 
Middle Income  232,195  350,107  310,863 
     Lower middle income  175,911  228,729  208,372 
     Upper middle income  56,284  121,378  102,492 
Low and middle income:  431,892  561,397  541,644 
   East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  139,904  142,270  133,753 
   Europe and Central Asia (ECA)  37,380  140,517  114,042 
   Latin America and Carib. (LA)  49,847  47,720  49,696 
   Middle East and N. Africa (MENA)  25,655  30,593  29,108 
   South Asia (SA)  132,128  129,690  129,043 
   Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  46,978  70,608  86,002 
High Income  156,710  143,278  135,941 
   Europe EMU  35,999  32,976  31,419 
World  588,602  704,675  677,585 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
 
As is visible in table III, from 1980 to 1991 land under cereal production increased at 
world  level,  but  such  increase  is  due  to  low-income  and  middle-income  countries.  High-
income-countries  show  a  decline  in  land  under  cereal  production,  being  the  decrease  in 
relative  terms  more  evident  in  the  Europe  EMU.  According  to  geographical  regions,  the 
increase is visible in Africa (more intense in Sub-Saharan than in North) and in Europe and 
Central Asia (associated to the political instability of the Central Asia in the period). From 
1991 to 2004, apart from the slight increase occurred in Latin America, the amount of land 
under cereal production only increased in low-income countries and particularly in the Sub-
Saharan region.  
Is this reduction of the amount of land translated in a decrease in cereal production? The 
answer  is  clearly  no.  On  the  contrary,  cereal  production  registered  a  significant  increase, 
which have permitted to feed an ascending population. In fact, from 1951 to 2000 the amount 
of cereals produced per capita only decreased in two periods, and not by any expected ending 
of resources: around 1960, reflecting the disastrous agricultural policy in China, and in the 
period from mid-1980s to mid-1990s in consequence of the economic and political disruption 
resulting from the fall of communism in countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union
8. 
So, the bulk of the increase in cereals production came from additions to productivity — 
that is, getting greater cereal yields from a given hectare of land as is visible from table IV, 
which uses as indicator of the level of productivity the cereal yields measured as kilograms 
per hectare of harvested land. In fact, in the last twenty-five years the cereal productivity at 
                                                 
7 In order to smooth annual oscillation in agricultural activity, the indicators of this, and of the subsequent tables, 
have been averaged over three years.  
8 See Dyson (1999) for a more complete view on the evolution of cereal production per capita in the second half 
of the 20
th century.   6
world level was doubled, which means that, it was increased at a pace significantly higher 
than the rate of growth of the world population (from 1980 to 2005 world population grew 
from 4.45 billion to roughly 6.44 billion). 
 
Table IV. Cereal yields 
  1979-81  1990-92  2003-05 
Low income  1,090  1,753  2,086 
Middle Income  1,811  2,987  3,312 
     Lower middle income  1,771  3,206  3,629 
     Upper middle income  1,892  2,453  2,673 
Low and middle income:  1,422  2,452  2,791 
   East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  2,034  3,816  4,460 
   Europe and Central Asia (ECA)  2,854  2,657  2,324 
   Latin America and Carib. (LA)  1,842  2,234  3,204 
   Middle East and N. Africa (MENA)  965  1,632  2,405 
   South Asia (SA)  1,510  1,992  2,497 
   Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  895  986  1,102 
High Income  3,400  4,263  5,041 
   Europe EMU  4,035  4,656  5,426 
World  1,608  2,868  3,247 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
 
But, behind the global average increase in world cereal productivity illustrated by table IV 
are large differences in regions, expression of the different technologies used for production. 
Especially noteworthy is the low level of productivity of Sub-Saharan Africa and the decrease 
in  productivity  in  low  and  middle-income  countries  of  Europe  and  Central  Asia  in 
consequence of the large increase in land under cereal production associated to the above-
mentioned disruption due to political factors.  
So, the momentous problem is how to increase cereal yields in low-income countries, and 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. This region has a lot of problems that conflict with food 
production.  It  is  composed  by  ethnically  heterogeneous  nation  states,  with  widespread 
political instability, absence of governamental policy directed to agriculture, AIDS epidemic, 
and a rather quick population growth. To search solutions to this problem generates two basic 
questions:  i)  has  the  pressure  of  population  growth  on  the  land,  measured  by  population 
density,  a  negative  effect  on the  growth  of  cereal yields? ii)  What  are  the more  relevant 
factors, from which depends the increase in cereal yields? 
Figure 1 helps to understand the relationship, if any, between the growth rates of cereal 
yields  from  1990  to  2005  and  the  population  density  in  2005,  for  samples  of  countries 
grouped by level of development and by geographical origin. As is apparent from figure 1, 
according to the geographical criterion the image is one of diversity, we see low density 
regions like ECA and MENA with very different performance in cereal yields, and a high 
density region like SA with above average growth rate of cereal yields. But, if we look at the 
samples of countries from the point of view of income per capita what seems to emerge is a 
positive relationship between the two variables, contrary to the Limits to Growth’s view. So, 
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Source: Data from World Bank (2007). Notes: the labels are referred to geographical regions, as is represented in 
Table III. Points without labels correspond to the samples of countries grouped by income per capita of the same 
table. 
 
Now, what can we say about the second question. Cereal yields depend on what? The 
obvious  answer  is  that  they  depend  on  the  several  production  inputs  like  land,  seeds, 
qualifications of farmers, the use of fertilizers, the machinery and so on. Many of these types 
of factors are qualitative or, when quantitative, are not represented in statistics. So, in a first 
sight we have tried to extract some conclusions from table V, where it is shown the figures of 
two  important  inputs  in  cereal  production:  the  consumption  of  fertilizers  and  use  of 
agricultural machines in three points of time: 1980, 1991 e 2002.  
As is apparent from the table whereas the fertilizer consumption decreases in high-income 
countries. This group of countries, which had already the highest productivity in 1980, and 
that have continuously increased the cereal yield, did not need to increase the consumption of 
fertilizers to increase the yield, showing that increases in productivity can be associated to 
other technological improvements like soil fertility management and plant varieties.  
On  the  contrary,  on  average,  in  low  and  middle-income  countries,  the  raise  of  cereal 
yields was accompanied by increases in the use of fertilizers. Of course there are regional 
differences  in  low  and  middle-income  countries:  whereas  South  Asia  has  showed  a 
sustainable increase in both the consumption of fertilizers and the agricultural machinery used 
in line with the “Green Revolution” occurred, Sub-Saharan Africa has followed the inverse 
path. But the most significant decrease in fertilizer consumption  has occurred in ECA, which 
is not a surprising fact due to the previously mentioned reasons. 
However, this shows that there is great potential to raise cereal production in ECA, and 
particularly in Poland, Ukraine, Russia, and Kazakhstan, when the disruptive effects of the 
end of communism disappear, and the reforms of the farming sector begin to produce results. 
Certainly, the recent EU membership will be an additional factor in help to accelerate the 
structural transformation in some of the Eastern European countries
9.  
Respecting to the agricultural machinery, the most spectacular increase in the variable 
occurred in low-income countries in spite of the raise in arable land. However, in this group 
of countries the level of mechanization is yet extremely low: is less than a half of the world 
average.  So,  there  is  large  room  for  increasing  agricultural  inputs  with  expectable 
improvements  in  production.  The  recent  increase  in  food  prices,  together  with  some 
improvements in financial system, can be an important starting point for extended the “Green 
                                                 











































Revolution”  to  parts  of  the  developing  world  were  investment  in  agriculture  was  been 
overlooked in the near past.  
 
Table V. Agricultural inputs 
  Fertilizer consumption  
(100 grams per hectare of arable 
land) 
Agricultural machinery  
(Tractors per 100 sq km of arable 
land) 
  1979-81  1990-92  2000-02  1979-81  1990-92  2001-03 
Low income  290  541  686  20  52  84 
Middle Income  969  970  1,110  114  127  137 
     Lower middle income  996  1,278  1,573  101  99  112 
     Upper middle income  914  553  471  139  164  173 
Low and middle income:  635  817  951  67  100  117 
   East Asia and Pacific (EAP)  1,117  ...  ...  55  63  89 
   Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA)  1,445  581  347  266  172  185 
   Latin America and Carib. 
(LA)  587  587  896  95  123  123 
   Middle East and N. Africa 
(MENA)  422  643  833  61  115  142 
   South Asia (SA)  360  767  1,067  25  67  129 
   Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)  158  136  125  23  19  13 
High Income  1,328  1,213  1,212  385  417  431 
   Europe EMU  2,704  2,332  2,059  878  992  1,002 
World  870  925  1,020  175  186  200 
Source: World Bank (2007). Note: (…) means data not available. 
 
The comparative analysis of the tables III, IV and V shows that the increase in the cereal 
production necessary to feed the growing world population came essentially from increases in 
productivity, and that the higher productivity was obtained without significantly investments 
in agricultural machinery. If so, there is a large margin to continue increasing agricultural 
production even if the production of bio-fuels is now efficient.  
But, to support and complement the above ideas on the causes and prospects of cereal 
productivity  evolution,  we  have  regressed  the  growth  rate  of  cereal  yield  on  the  rates  of 
growth  of  two  variables:  land  under  cereal  production  and  fertilizer  consumption.  The 
regression is for the 1960-2004
10 period and uses a cross-section of 106 countries. To control 
the country level of development we add to the explaining variables the GDP per capita (in 
log scale), converted to current US$ by PPPs (purchasing power parities). The results are in 
table VI. 
The  results  show  that  whereas  the  increase  in  land  under  cereal  production  exert  a 
negative  effect  on  the  growth  rate  of  cereal  yields,  the  consumption  of  fertilizers  acts 
positively, being the level of development of the country an important control factor. That is, 
we can expect that, maintaining other factors constant, the more the level of development of a 
country is the more the growth rate of cereal yields will be. Perhaps not surprising is the 
statistically  insignificant  coefficient  of  agricultural  machinery,  indicating  that  the  surplus 
labor  in  the  generality  of  low-income  countries  renders  the  investment  in  machinery  not 
worthwhile. 
                                                 
10 The indicators for the arable land in the World Bank (2007) are very sparse for 2004 and 2005, and so in 
practice  the  rate  of  growth  of  arable  land  is  only  representative  of  the  1962-2002  period.  As  in  the  other 
calculations, in this paper we take for beginning and end of the time periods averages of three years.   9
Table VI. Regression results.  
Dependent variable: annual growth rate of cereal yields in the 1960-2004 period 
  1960-2002 












Agricultural machinery  ---  -0.008 
(-0.457) 




2 R   0.24  0.24 
Source: World Bank (2007). 
t tests in parentheses, below coefficients: *significant at 1 percent level; **significant at 5 percent level. 
 
Differently from being a worry this absence of statistical significance can be a hope to the 
less  developed  countries,  which  may  go  on  producing  without  a  significant  and  costly 
investment in machinery. On the contrary, they can adopt the less costly best practice of the 
small  farmers  in  the  developed  world  at  the  same  time  as  they  can  augment  agricultural 
production without increase significantly the rural exodus. The recent increase in food prices 




The analysis of the evolution of land under cereal production, other production inputs and 
the cereal yields shows that the dismal prophecies spurred by the recent increase in the food 
prices could prove justly as incorrect as in the past. The bulk of increase in the capacity to 
feed a growing population came from increases in cereal yields rather than from the fruits of a 
rising pressure over land. 
In fact, more population means not only more open mouths but also persons equipped 
with arms and brains. So, more people can mean more ideas about the possible combination 
of the existent resources. And, as is stressed by Romer (2003) ideas are more important than 
physical resources in boosting economic growth.  
Obviously, with more population and the need of more goods to satisfy its wants we'll 
have increasingly problems. But it is possible to argue that new ideas will prevail over the 
effects of the extra resource use. New technology could help ease the resource crisis, as well 
as some constraints might disappear with greater global cooperation. Where some countries 
face  scarcity,  others  have  plentiful  supplies  of  resources.  New  seed  varieties  and  better 
irrigation  techniques  could  open  up  arid  regions  to  crop  growing,  as  well  as  some 
technological advances can be used for land and water desalination or for generating and 
spreading electricity at more efficient ways. 
Of course, price incentives play an important role. The analysis of past problems proves 
that with the adequate incentives, economic forces stimulated solutions. Scarcity of resource 
led to higher prices, and higher prices eventually led to innovation. So, while higher cereal 
prices are clearly a trouble to poor consumers, they also present an opportunity to encourage 
cereal production and enhance the contribution of agriculture to medium and long run growth. 
For  example,  higher  prices  weaken  the  rationale  for  import  tariffs,  and  make  easy  the 
implementation of politically difficult trade reforms.  
Higher cereal prices can also help to turn around the last couple decades’ tendency for 
decreasing investment in the agricultural sector, by government and private sector, both in   10
developed  and,  moreover,  in  developing  countries.  This  refocus  is  necessary  to  promote 
agricultural productivity, which must be stimulated by investments in research and extension 
in  high-income  countries  and  supported  in  development  of  rural  financial  markets  and 
diffusion of best practices in the low and middle-income countries, progressively providing to 
the latter, especially in Africa, conditions similar to the existing in the rural areas of the high 
income countries. 
In  the  past,  the  now  developed  world  demonstrated  a  large  capacity  to  adjust  to  the 
resource  limitations.  Indeed,  the  true  lesson  of  Thomas  Malthus,  is  not  that  the  world  is 
condemned, but that preservation of human life requires analysis and consequent action. A 
more attention directed to agriculture is key to reducing poverty and hunger in developing 
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